



## **Securing Europe's Energy Frontline: Preparing Now for Winter 2026–2027**

*Appeal of the Participants of the Kyiv Security Forum Roundtable, held in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference, to the Heads of Government of the G7 and the European Union*

We, the participants of the Kyiv Security Forum roundtable convened in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference on 14 February 2026, address the Heads of Government of the G7 and the European Union at a moment of acute strategic urgency. The year 2026 marks a decisive phase in Russia's war against Ukraine. The coming winter will test not only Ukraine's endurance but also the collective ability of democratic nations to protect civilians from the weaponization of energy. **Preparation for the winter of 2026–2027 must begin immediately.**

Russia's sustained campaign against Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure constitutes crimes against humanity under international law. Through sustained missile and drone strikes against energy infrastructure, particularly during the coldest periods of the year, Russia seeks to impose humanitarian collapse, undermine social resilience, and compel political capitulation. The deliberate destruction of electricity and heating systems in winter constitutes a grave war crime and a direct assault on civilian survival. There are no credible grounds to expect that Russia will halt these actions; the escalation of attacks over the past winters demonstrates the opposite.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has launched many thousands of missiles and attack drones against Ukraine's territory, with a significant share directed at the country's energy sector. Official Ukrainian data confirm more than 700 aerial missile and drone attacks targeting energy facilities between February 2022 and July 2025, followed by 256 additional missile and drone attacks between October 2025 and mid-January 2026 alone. Major operators continue to face repeated destruction, with facilities of one leading private energy company attacked more than 220 times. The humanitarian exposure of civilians reflects the same systematic pressure: in the most affected regions, air-raid alerts have cumulatively lasted more than 250 days, while nearly 19,000 alerts were recorded in 2025 alone. Repeated mass attacks have produced long-duration nationwide blackouts, often lasting 10–20 hours at a time.

Ukraine is therefore living through an extreme humanitarian and security emergency. Around 40% of Ukrainians experience very poor heating or none at all, while 74% face highly unstable electricity supply or are without power, and in some regions

outages last up to 20 hours per day. The country has lost a substantial share of generating capacity, with deficit reaching 3-5 GW, leaving the system capable of supplying only about 40% of demand for households and businesses after covering critical infrastructure and defense needs. Thermal and hydroelectric power plants, as well as transmission and distribution grids, have been severely damaged, creating not only a generation shortfall but also an inability to transmit electricity to regions where demand is highest. Electricity imports cannot fully compensate for the deficit, as damaged transmission corridors prevent power from being efficiently transferred from western regions of Ukraine to central and industrial areas of the country. This is a deliberate war of attrition directed against an entire society.

On the basis of consultations with Ukraine's leading energy operators, transmission companies, district-heating providers, international financial institutions, and security experts, we respectfully call upon the European Commission, the governments of the G7, and the Member States of the European Union to launch an urgent, coordinated energy-resilience package structured around the following operational priorities.

### **1. Immediate procurement and accelerated delivery of critical equipment**

Ukraine's energy recovery is constrained not only by financing but by production lead times, manufacturing capacity, and logistics. Many critical components require 10–24 months from financing approval to delivery and installation; therefore, procurement decisions must be taken immediately.

#### **Priority equipment needs include:**

- High-voltage transformers, autotransformers, switchgear, breakers, protection and control systems, and other substation restoration equipment;
- Turbine, boiler, and generator components required to restore CHP and TPP capacity, including strategic spare-parts reserves;
- Mobile and modular generation units (gas piston, gas turbine, and industrial-scale back-up systems);
- District-heating restoration equipment, including pumps, pipes, valves, heat exchangers, and modular boiler systems;
- Pre-positioned rapid-repair equipment stocks to replace assets repeatedly destroyed by strikes.

Several rapid restoration programs already prepared by operators demonstrate the scale of achievable results: one major program alone could restore approximately 3,000 MW of capacity with an investment envelope of roughly €300 million, half of which has already been secured internally, leaving approximately €150 million to be mobilized externally for implementation before the next winter cycle.

### **2. Fast, targeted financing focused on deliverables**

Financial assistance must be structured to ensure that committed resources translate directly into equipment procurement, installed capacity, and operational resilience. We recommend:

- Establishment of a fast-track EU–G7 Energy Resilience Facility dedicated specifically to procurement, logistics, and installation of energy-system equipment;
- Deployment of blended finance instruments combining grants, guarantees, and concessional loans to offset war-risk premiums and accelerate decision-making;
- Expansion of war-risk and political-risk insurance mechanisms through existing development-finance institutions to mobilize large-scale private investment in restoration, distributed generation, and storage;
- Priority financing windows for short-cycle restoration projects capable of delivering measurable capacity additions before winter 2026–2027;
- Priority access for Ukrainian energy companies to global manufacturing queues for critical equipment — particularly high-voltage transformers — together with measures to shorten production lead times;
- Establishment of an international stockpile of available and refurbished energy equipment for rapid deployment to Ukraine. Such a stockpile would complement existing recovery mechanisms while bypassing lengthy procurement procedures, allowing equipment to be delivered at the final stage of replacement and significantly accelerating restoration and deployment.

### **3. Integrated protection and hardening of critical energy infrastructure**

Restoration investments cannot be sustained if newly repaired facilities are destroyed again. Energy-resilience assistance must therefore include dedicated protection measures:

- Priority air-defense coverage for key generation facilities, transmission nodes, and district-heating infrastructure;
- Counter-drone, counter-cruise-missile, and layered interception capabilities combined with electronic-warfare protection where applicable;
- Physical hardening, redundancy systems, and bypass infrastructure allowing rapid restoration of operations following strikes.

Air defense is indispensable but cannot substitute for structural resilience. Protection measures must therefore be implemented simultaneously with decentralization and diversification of generation.

### **4. Accelerated deployment of distributed generation, storage, and decentralized heating**

Distributed energy architecture significantly reduces the systemic impact of attacks. Ukrainian households, municipalities, and businesses have already mobilized approximately 1.7 GW of distributed back-up capacity. This effort should be rapidly scaled through:

- Incentive programs supporting households, municipalities, and SMEs in deploying distributed generators, hybrid systems, and battery storage;

- Rapid expansion of grid-scale storage and flexible generation, increasing system balancing capacity;
- Support for renewable and hybrid generation projects, including wind and solar facilities where security conditions permit;
- National and municipal programs to decentralize heat supply, replacing highly concentrated Soviet-era systems with building-level or neighborhood-level autonomous heating.

In major urban areas this transformation is both feasible and economically efficient. In Kyiv alone, approximately 6,000–7,000 residential buildings remain vulnerable due to heating-system disruption; conversion of roughly 5,000 legacy buildings to autonomous heating solutions is estimated at approximately €1.5 billion, offering durable resilience at a cost lower than many alternative emergency-response measures.

**Time is the decisive factor.** To ensure that restored capacity, protective measures, and distributed-generation systems are operational before winter 2026–2027, we call upon the European Commission, the governments of the G7, and the Member States of the European Union, in coordination with the Government of Ukraine, to ensure that no later than May 2026:

1. A joint prioritized equipment list is finalized and procurement decisions are approved;
2. Financing facilities, guarantees, and insurance instruments are fully operational;
3. Procurement contracts are placed and manufacturing production slots secured;
4. A coordinated plan for energy-infrastructure protection and air-defense coverage is agreed and implemented;
5. National-scale programs for distributed generation, storage deployment, and decentralized heating are launched with measurable capacity targets.

If these decisions are not taken within this timeframe, the consequences will be unavoidable. Due to 10–24-month manufacturing and installation cycles, critical equipment will not be operational before winter, leaving millions of civilians exposed to prolonged blackouts and heating disruptions. Continued large-scale outages will constrain economic recovery, increase fiscal pressures, expand humanitarian assistance requirements, and significantly raise the long-term cost of reconstruction for Ukraine and its international partners.

Ensuring reliable electricity and heating in Ukraine is not only a humanitarian necessity; it is a strategic requirement for European and transatlantic security. Timely action will reduce the effectiveness of Russia's energy-terror strategy, protect civilian populations, and strengthen the resilience of the democratic security order.

An Energy Ramstein coordination mechanism must therefore be urgently established, supported by a dedicated international task force responsible for synchronizing equipment procurement, financing, infrastructure protection, and implementation timelines.

**Arseniy Yatsenyuk**

Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum, Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-2016)

**Maxim Timchenko**

Chief Executive Officer, DTEK Group

**General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army (Ret.)**

Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency,

Member of the KSF Security Council

**Marko Mihkelson**

Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Parliament of Estonia

**Andriy Kobolev**

Founder, *Eney* Company

**Yehor Cherniev**

Deputy Chairman,

National Security & Defense Committee, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Head of the Ukrainian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

**Petras Auštrevičius**

Member of the European Parliament (Lithuania)

**Steven Pifer**

U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (1998–2000)

**Professor Nathalie Tocci**

Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali

Professor of Practice, SAIS Europe, Johns Hopkins University